Copenhagen Climate Negotiations - latest EU, G20, African Union positions

The EU this week released its latest negotiating positions for the Copenhagen climate talks - including on the controversial aspects of climate finance. For a clear report, take a look at the EU Observer. To get into the geeky detail, take a look at the Communication 'Stepping up international climate finance: A European blueprint for the Copenhagen deal'"(an EU Communication is a non-binding statement of intent from the EU Commission, the Brussels-based bureaucracy charged with initiating discussions that are subsequently taken up by the EU Parliament and Council of Ministers).

One of the key aspects is that public financial commitments are further squeezed (or retreated from as an idea). Instead, the EU claims that financing for tackling climate change should be built around carbon market revenues and private finance (aka investment opportunities for EU-based corporations).

A second key aspect (as I've mentioned earlier in this blog) is the proposed "sectoral crediting mechanism." Although the EU talks this up as an improvement upon the discredited Clean Development Mechanism, it is suspiciously silent on the fact that the shift from "project based" to "sectoral" crediting means that the last, inadequate lines of environmental impact assessment would be circumvented. This is mainly in the interest of "unblocking" the CDM bottleneck - the complaint from financial institutions that they can't grow this market quickly enough.

Further info can be found in this background "staff working document, this Q+A and press release

While the EU has set out figures in the region of €2-15 billion for climate financing, the African Union is suggesting a figure of $200 billion by 2020.

The US, meanwhile, has yet to come up with a proposal at all.

Finally, a series of position papers for the forthcoming G20 summit in Pittsburgh reveal are distinctly worrying (and predictable) in their emphasis on private sector market openings and various means to expand global carbon markets

Tar-sands protest in UK

(an anti-tar sands protester, "sludged up" and expressing his revulsion outside BP's London office)

I've taken an involuntary summer/book writing blogging hiatus... but in the meantime, it is worth checking out the Indigenous Environment Network's launch of an anti-tar sands campaign in the UK. Yesterday's protest at BP and Sell was just the start...

Nuclear energy is not a clean alternative

Here´s one more graphic from the UNEP/Grid-Arendal, which is topical given the push to promote nuclear energy as a "clean" source (in the face of much evidence to the contrary).

Geeky carbon trading related fact: Lithuania had the largest surplus of carbon credits in the first phase of the EU´s Emissions Trading Scheme, exporting 33% of its credits to other countries in the EU. The underlying reason for its surplus was the planned closure of Ignalina, a nuclear power plant with a similar design to Chernobyl, which is taking place by phases. Lithuania claimed that the replacement power generation capacity will come from dirty coal plants instead. As a result it gained a large surplus of credits, which have been sold on and treated as “emissions reductions” elsewhere - including the UK (which was the largest purchaser of credits in the first phase of the EU Emissions Trading Scheme). They are, of course, nothing of the sort.

Animal farts and burps and climate change

Source: UNEP/GRID-Arendal

Apparently the above diagram was commissioned for a UN study on carbon neutrality. The UNEP/GRID-Arendal project is a mine of weird and wonderful climate change graphics.

Jonathan Pershing on the outcome of the Bonn climate talks

Jonathan Pershing is the US Deputy Special Envoy for Climate Change, and was the lead US negotiator at the Bonn climate talks. Here´s what he had to say, and a few comments to decode its significance:

Bilaterals
Asked about the bilateral meeting held between the US and China during the talks, he said that the US is “working for a conclusion not just here but in other forms – perhaps most notably the MEF [Major Economies Forum]”. The emphasis in these bilaterals is on a “foundation of shared understanding”. Pershing left Bonn to join Todd Stern´s delegation in Beijing for “an engaged conversation” that was “very fruitful” (Stern is Special Envoy for Climate Change, the US lead negotiator).

The timing of these bilaterals was not arbitrary - it served to keep key Chinese negotiators in Beijing, which can help to isolate them from the rest of the G77 (developing countries) grouping. It might also serve to set up a media blame game in which the US looks to China for greater commitments, despite the fact that US per capita emissions remain three times higher than those of China and are historically on a wholly different scale.

A new agreement?
“The US is of the view that we need a new agreement... we need to frame what comes next.” The US has proposed an “implementing agreement of the Convention, to which we are a party.... we are of the view that all Parties must take action, including the US, but that doesn´t excuse countries like China or Korea.” [The United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change was signed in Rio in 1992, and is the legal basis for the Copenhagen talks later this year]. The US submission is “framed as a complete agreement... which frames a vision of how we might move forward.” He also noted that “we are not a party to the Kyoto Protocol.. so our intention is using the Convention structure going forward”

The key political point here relates to fears that the legal form of a new agreement could undermine the Kyoto Protocol. The latter has many negative aspects to it - most notably, it is the basis for carbon offsetting under the Clean Development Mechanism (CDM). But the intention is not to scrap this, but rather something called "differentiation" - dividing up the grouping of developing nations. Such a move also absolves the US of its failure to ratify Kyoto.

Pershing also emphasised a “long term strategy” in which developed countries set a quantitative limit in relation to a baseline year while for developing countries “the actions are binding but not the outcomes.” He also stated that the US plan requires that developing countries “state when they would take on these kinds of commitments” to a quantitative reduction in relation to a baseline year.

Some “additional resources” are anticipated by the US especially for the “less developed” countries, and technology is a “central part” of this discussion.

Historical Responsibility
On historical responsibility, he drew attention to remarks by Stern at the last meeting in Bonn, summarising in these terms: “we recognise as a matter of fact that the US has historical responsibility for the largest share of emissions going back” and recognising also that the US has a “significant capacity” to take action.

Redefining "finance" within a private investment framework
The “vast majority” of the money for tackling climate change is private finance, Pershing said. The aim is to “leverage the various tools at our disposal to shift these investments” so we need a “marginal shift” to do this. He explained that the money concerned is not the whole cost of projects but, for example, the difference between regular coal power and CCS, or between “low till and no till agriculture.”

On public finance, he noted that public finance is generally emphasised in the UN context and said that “we´d like to change that debate”. In this regard, he highlighted offsets as a means to “provide substantial streams of money” if they are “scaled appropriately.”

Instead of paying the US climate debt, the proposal here is to reframe the issue in order to open new markets for the private sector.

Divide and rule: the politics of climate negotiations

Want to know how global treaties get stitched up? You could do far worse than read this new briefing by Oilwatch International. It outlines the following tactics to force a treat in the interest of the developed countries at the expense of a just climate deal:

• Controlling the discourse. Shape the narrative and expectations of negotiators and the public about what constitutes success and failure – including misleading the media.

• Ambush and push. Seeking a sudden deal before developing countries have time to assess the implications.
  

• Mischaracterizing policy as science. This is a way to depoliticise the claims of the powerful – for example, by arguing that IPCC reports make recommendations about the north/south balance of action to tackle climate change.

• Obscuring the details. Setting goals and expectations in different statistical terms, making the implications difficult to evaluate and compare

• Building a Trojan Horse. The inclusion of developed country officials or consultants in developing country delegations, who then mischaracterise their positions.

• Carving out special deals. Splitting up developing countries by offering special deals to sub-groups – for example, in relation to market access in trade negotiations, or in relation to aid provisions.

• Establishing new groupings of countries. Breaking the ties between developing country groupings by championing new groupings – normally, by developed countries defining that sub-grouping in relation to “favourable treatment” offered in the form of a special deal

• Setting up the blame game. Characterising larger developing countries as “reluctant” while championing the unambitious efforts of developed country governments.

• Divide and rule narratives. For example, seeking to juxtapose a “right to survival” narrative of some developing countries with a “right to development” narrative of others – shifting attention from developed country obligations.

• Forum shopping. Larger developed countries and country groupings – such as the European Union – coordinate actions across a number of different forums – eg. in negotiations outside the climate arena, where officials who do not know the issues are encouraged to ratify positions that circumvent negotiating stances in the climate talks.

• Establishing other forums. New forums are also created to circumvent the UNFCCC process – the Major Economies Forum being a notable example. This is also part of agenda-setting and media messaging for the formal negotiations

• Inappropriate chairing and biased texts. Circumventing the proper channels to advance biased negotiating texts, which are ordered to reflect industrialised country interests – for example, by using developed country proposals as the basic structure, while lumping developing country submissions together in a single block.

• Green rooms. “In the context of the WTO, small group settings – or “green rooms – have been used to cut deals between small groups of powerful countries, with participation (often largely symbolic) by “representatives” of other countries. Green rooms have provided a means for isolating “problematic” countries, advancing negotiations with relatively inexperienced ministers, or excluding key negotiators (on the basis of insufficient seniority). ”

• Green men. Another WTO trick, through which Chairs appoint individuals to “facilitate” consensus on specific issues the development of consensus on specific issues.... forcing the agenda to a biased conclusion.

• Moving up the ladder. Ministerial-level meetings and Summits are sometimes used to marginalizes and overturn the positions of developing country negotiators who “know too much” and are therefore seen as obstacles by developed countries to achieving their interests.

• Use of non-governmental organizations. NGOs cane be useful, but can also be used to do the dirty work of gathering intelligence and lobbying of the developed country governments who fund them

Climate Camel

As if the world of UN climate talks weren´t surreal enough, Avaaz brought camels to Bonn. Their presence was meant to highlight how climate change exacerbates the threat of desertification. Given the under-representation of those at the frontline of desertification in these talks, it just looked a bit crass.